While being defeated in Iraq and Syria, the so-called Islamic State still fights on in other regions. In the Sinai they appear to hold their ground – despite a brutal crackdown by the country's military.
In November 2017, as Egypt reeled from a devastating terrorist attack, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi shed any notions of a restrained or limited effort against its perpetrators and vowed to use “all brute force.” Sisi’s promise was in response to the Rawda mosque attack, considered the deadliest terrorist attack in Egypt’s modern history. During Friday prayer militants launched an attack on the Rawda mosque in Northern Sinai, killing 305 people and wounding 128.
In response to al-Sisi’s order, the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, in February 2018, announced the launch of the “Comprehensive Operation Sinai 2018 – COS 18.” The operation, which involved the army, navy, air force, border patrol, and police forces, aimed at “cleansing” the terrorists from the area (mainly in Northern Sinai and the Nile Delta) and protecting Egyptian society from the threats of terrorism and extremism. After two years, it is still debated whether COS 18 achieved substantial progress with regard to its goals or not. An expert on terrorism at al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Mr. Ahmad Kamel al-Beheiri mentions that, “the situation in Sinai is relatively better than July 2015, and COS 18 has achieved some relative gains.” However, an Egyptian security analyst, who spoke to zenith on condition of anonymity and will be referred as (A.), suggests that “the gains made during the COS 18 were relatively short-lived!”
ISIS’s branch in Northern Sinai (Wilayat Sinai, WS), and previously known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM), is the most significant insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula. ABM was originally made up of local Salafist jihadists and some Palestinian jihadists, who were present and operating in the Sinai Peninsula for several years under different jihadist groups. Before it swore allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014, ABM/WS was affiliated with al-Qaeda. Between late 2010 and late 2013, ABM focused primarily on attacking Israeli civilian and military targets; furthermore, ABM claimed the responsibility for numerous attacks against a Sinai pipeline exporting gas to Israel. In the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, security forces fled both the towns of Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid (in Northern Sinai); ABM exploited the political and security vacuum and attacked some police stations and security headquarters in Northern Sinai.
A significant change in ABM’s narrative, propaganda, and operations took place after Egypt’s former President Mohammed Morsi was ousted by the military in July 2013. ABM sought to take advantage of the government crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, use the situation for its benefit, and attract more members, supporters and sympathizers; therefore, ABM started to extensively target and attack Egyptian security forces. Since ABM pledged allegiance to ISIS in November 2014 and changed its name to WS, it has adopted several propaganda and operational tactics similar to ISIS branches in Syria and Iraq, including the publication of execution videos, and using improved explosive devices (IEDs). WS has carried out several sophisticated attacks in Northern Sinai and in the mainland which targeted not only the Egyptian security forces, but also civilians in order to undermine al-Sisi’s government. In October 2015, the group claimed responsibility for downing the Russian Metrojet flight from Sharm el-Sheikh to St Petersburg, killing 224 passengers and crew on board, as well as claiming responsibility for several attacks against Christians and churches in Northern Sinai and in the mainland.
COS 18 was the latest in a long string of counterinsurgency operations launched by the Egyptian government to fight terrorist groups in Northern Sinai, “Six counterinsurgency operations were launched between 2011 and 2018: Eagle 1 (under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, SCAF), Eagle 2 (under President Moahmed Morsi), and four Martyr’s Right operations (under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi),” said Mr. al-Beheiri. He points out that COS 18 was relatively different from other operations, “more forces were included, not only the Second Field Army. The COS 18 was also able to destroy the organizational structure of the insurgency group, through the targeting and killing of leaders and other prominent influential figures within WS.” Based on the statements published by the army spokesperson throughout the COS 18, the Egyptian army has killed 464 alleged terrorists and arrested 7,491 individuals. This figure differs sharply from the 1250 estimated WS militants (at the highest estimates), per the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy!
"Evidence suggests that ISIS attacks are becoming more deadly"
In the context of a decapitation strategy of a terrorist organization, the question of efficiency is posed. “Many high level operatives, including Abu Anas al-Ansary, the reported head of ABM, and Abu Hajr al-Hashimi, the reported planner of Rawda mosque attack, were killed among others. The death of group leaders has a negative impact on the organization and has afflicted its operations, because jihadi organizations depend neither upon institutions nor on ideologies, but rather on central leaders,” al-Behiri explains. Mr. Mahmoud Gamal, researcher and blogger about security and military affairs, says to zenith that, “killing leaders and imposing a crippling siege on insurgency groups in Sinai have led to the weakening of WS’s capacity to launch large-scale operations.” However, Mr. Oded Berkowitz, the Deputy Chief Intelligence Officer at MAX Security, says, “WS definitely sustained significant loss, but their capabilities are still very much there, they are still operational, not only in small scale attacks, but sometimes in large-scale attacks.”
“Recent evidence suggests that ISIS attacks are becoming more deadly,” based on Dr. Zack Gold’s quantitative analysis for WS operations in 2019. Dr. Gold writes, “From the last quarter of 2018 to the second quarter of 2019, the number of claimed ISIS-Sinai attacks actually decreased by a quarter, from 81 to 60. But the number of alleged casualties grew to almost two-and-a-half times larger, from 80 to 196, pointing to a change in the type, target, and size of ISIS-Sinai attacks this year.” A. points out that the group showed resiliency over the past six years and says that, “WS has also proven its ability to replenish its ranks after major security operations by recruiting locals,” he adds that “despite increased security pressure from COS 2018, WS can still effectively target Egyptian Security Forces and enjoys a fair amount of operational freedom. The group continues to target civilians allegedly collaborating with the security forces or contracting for the military in factories and projects.”
The local population, who are mostly Bedouins, have been heavily involved in and negatively impacted by the ongoing events. COS 18 recognized the importance of involving locals in fighting militants in the Sinai Peninsula, as “in part they know the terrain and the area much better than anyone else, and as WS got into a conflict with the Tarabeen tribe, one of, if not the biggest tribe in the Sinai, over smuggling interests” Mr. Berkowitz says to zenith. Mr. al-Behiri adds that “following the attack on the Rawda mosque, tribal mobilization took place, and the Union of Sinai Tribes vowed to take an active role in eliminating the presence of militants in the restive peninsula, especially al-Sawarka tribe, one of the largest tribes in Sinai.” Therefore, “tribes have been cooperating with the Egyptian army and its military intelligence service, on one hand they have been providing intelligence about the militants’ hideouts; on the other hand, some tribal members, especially from Tarabeen and Tiyaha tribes, join military convoys in certain areas under the control of the tribe,” Mr. Gamal explains. Although involving tribes and local population in combating terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula is crucial, strategies to integrate those volunteers formally in security forces do not exist. It’s also worth mentioning the danger that those who volunteer with the military expose themselves to, as WS has continually targeted and executed “collaborators with the Egyptian government.”
The typical heavy-handed approach of the Egyptian military has had dire implications on the living population in Sinai. Attempts to expand buffer zones and destroy tunnels to curb the smuggling of weapons to WS have led to mass displacements of locals, “part of the strategy (COS18) is to destroy the logistical supply of WS, and cut off smuggling routes between IS and Gaza strip; however, locals are displaced as a by-product of the bigger strategy. For example, the Egyptian side of Rafah is non-existent at this point. Everything has been destroyed,” Mr. Berkowitz says. Mr. Gamal explains to zenith, “civilians in Sinai are suffering from WS brutal attacks, as well as from the restrictive conditions, as residents can’t move freely because of the curfew imposed.” In its report, “If You Are Afraid for Your Lives, Leave Sinai!”, published in May 2019, Human Rights Watch documented widespread abuses committed by the Egyptian military as well as by militants, which include mass arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture, extrajudicial killings, and possibly unlawful air and ground attacks against civilians, that the group said, “amount to war crimes”.
Although the scale and scope of the COS 18 was promising, it was not really practical from the beginning to give a span of three months to completely eradicate terrorism and extremism as an objective. COS 18 succeeded in killing some leaders of ISIS’s branch in Northern Sinai; however, the results are not sustainable, especially, if mass violation against civilians are practiced. Three scenarios were discussed with analysts for the future of WS in Northern Sinai; first an optimistic scenario, “I think it’s almost over, especially after COS 18, and the killing of many leaders and influential figures of WS,” Mr. Gamal. The second scenario mentioned is a pessimistic one, and the most dangerous, “IS will use the violations against residents, gain more support from local communities, and will grow in influence and power!” says Mr. Berkowitz. The third and most probable scenario, A. says it is the “continuation of the status quo. North Sinai will likely provide Egypt with an enduring and persistent insurgent threat. Even if the military does deal WS a decisive blow, unaddressed socio-economic difficulties will continually provide a fertile environment for extremist organizations to flourish!”